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Abstract 
This research empirically examines the effect of firms' performance and corporate gover-
nance attributes on directors' pay. To attain the objective, the data for the period from 2007 to 2014 
are retrieved from annual reports of 52 listed financial firms. Return on assets and return on equity 
are utilized to measure performance. Board size, board independence, board ownership and CEO 
duality are employed as corporate governance practices. Using the random effect model, the perfor-
mance has positively related to directors’ pay, but level of significance is sensitive across perfor-
mance proxies. The board independence has negatively significantly influenced the directors' pay. 
However, board ownership significantly positively influenced the directors’ pay. Furthermore, board 
size and CEO duality both have not significantly associated with directors’ pay.  




One mechanism to align the interests of the firms' executives among the interest of share-
holders is through providing the monetary benefits1. Generally the agency theory argues that equity 
incentive and stock option to the executives could be used to align the incentive of institution’s top 
management with the shareholder’s interest (Fama and Jesen, 1983; Jesen and Meckling, 1976). 
This issue is at the center of interest of many researchers around the globe, whether the compensa-
tion paid to the executives is helpful to enhance the role of the board of directors, which improves 
the firm performance through better corporate governance practices. Today, the labor market of di-
rectors has been very competitive due to the fact that the directors are not only accountable to the 
shareholders about the success or the failure of achievement of firm’s goal, but also they are being 
monitored by the external forces2. The success pays the directors through an increase in incentives 
within the firm or a lucrative contract being offered from the market. Therefore, the question wheth-
er the directors’ compensation increases the firm performance grasps the attention of many re-
searchers around the globe such as Unite et al., (2008) in Philippines, Duffhues & Kabir, (2008) in 
Netherlands, Kato & Kubo, (2006) in Japan, Tian & Yang, (2014) in America, Aggarwal & Ghosh 
(2014) in India, Jaffar et al., (2012) in Malaysia and Firth et al., (2006) in China.  
 The firms may follow the relation-based agreements rather than the market-based agree-
ments while setting remuneration (Luo & Jockson, 2012b) in countries with weak corporate gover-
nance practices. The management can be involved in such activities to enhance their own compensa-
                                                 
1 Firms provide them “Perks” which in fact enhance the overall pay of directors. 
2 External forces (human resource department of other firms) are always keen to analyze the performance of directors in 
the market to hire the best incumbent for their firm on attractive pay. 
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tion by utilizing additional resources at monitory shareholder’s cost. For example, the execu-
tives/CEO with supreme power may make risky investments (Adams et al., 2005). However, an op-
timal remuneration agreement is very vital because the level of CEO/executive power not only af-
fect the interest of minority shareholder but also the stability of the national economy. For instance, 
in the financial crisis of 2008, poor bank CEO/executive incentives are criticized to be one major 
fundamental reason of financial crisis (Blinder, 2009; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011).     
The corporate governance attributes such as board of directors, the composition of the board, 
compensation committee and compensation of directors have become a research subject for different 
scholars (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009). These attributes need to be matched and integrated with insti-
tutional policies. For instance, under the element Structure of board context, board size (Mayers & 
Smith, 2010), board independence (Basu et al., 2007), board ownership (Liang et al., 2013), CEO 
duality (Dorara & Petra, 2008) and board meetings are needed to establish and review the effective-
ness during the implementation.  
Based on the agency theory, it has been reasoned that the shareholders' interest and manage-
ments' interest can be aligned by linking compensation of the management to the performance. This 
paper studies the relationship among directors’ pay, firm governance, and performance of the Pakis-
tani financial firms because conflict of interest is higher in the financial sector due to issues of asset-
liquidity and high debt ratio (Becher et al., 2005). The previous studies (e.g., Hussain et al., 2014; 
Usman et al., 2015; Lone et al., 2015; Sheikh & Kareem, 2015) focus on CEO pay using the data of 
the banking sector of Pakistan only. As per the authors' best knowledge, this is a first effort to inves-
tigate the impact of performance and corporate governance characteristics on directors' pay on fi-
nancial sector of Pakistan.  
Using the data of listed financial sector firms from 2007 to 2014, this study finds a signifi-
cant positive effect of performance on pay (using all three proxies to pay such as total directors' pay, 
executive directors' pay, and CEOs' pay) when pay is measured as ROA while this relationship is 
only significant for total directors' pay when performance is measured as ROE. Furthermore, firms 
with higher ratio of independent directors pay lower compensation while board ownership has a sig-
nificant positive effect on directors' pay. Moreover, this study fails to find a significant impact on 
board size and the CEO duality of directors' pay. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next session reviews the previous literature, the 
3rd session discusses the data and methodology, the 4th session explain the results, and the final ses-
sion provides the conclusion. 
 
Literature Review 
Pay and Performance 
The significant positive association between pay and performance aligns the interests of 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Prior investigations show inconsis-
tency about the impact of organizational performance on the directors' compensation. Using the 
book and market measures of performance in different countries, the studies (e.g., Kato & Kubo, 
2006; Firth et al., 2006; Jafaar et al., 2012; Shaih-Hou and Cheng, 2012) show that executives of 
well performing firms are paid more as compared to low performing firms. Using the cross country 
data, some authors (Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000; Mitsudome et al., 2008) find similar results that 
executives' compensation is higher in well performing firms. In a study of Philippine firms, using 
different measures of performing, Unite et al. (2008) show significant positive relation between ex-
ecutive directors' pay and  the performance, but this relationship is insignificant to the CEOs' pay. 
Furthermore, they point out the link between pay and performance is less important in the case of 
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family business groups. Fernandes (2008), Duffhues and Kabir (2008), and Abdullah (2006) do not 
find any relationship between the remuneration and corporate performance in Portugal, The Nether-
lands, and Malaysia respectively. The negative association between the remuneration and perfor-
mance was found by Brick et al. (2006), and Tee and Hooy, (2009). In India Aggarwal and Ghosh 
(2015) document that the remuneration of directors and corporate performance has positive related 
when considering the accounting prospect, but these results are sensitive to the investor point of 
view.   
Using the financial sector of America, Becher et al. (2005) conclude that increase in incen-
tive of bank director also enhance the performance of bank without increasing risk. On the other 
hand, Doucouliagos et al. (2007) find the significant positive relation between the performance of 
the bank and CEO remuneration in Australia, but they fail to find the significant relationship be-
tween overall directors’ compensation and bank performance. Similar results were found (Lee and 
Isa, 2015) in the case of Malaysia, but Luo (2015) found the insignificant results using the data of 
Chinese’s banks. In the context of Pakistan, recently the relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance is starting to examine. Some of these researches conducted on non-financial 
sector (Kashif and Mustafa, 2012; Hussain et al., 2014; Usman et al., 2015), few studies analyze the 
banking sector of Pakistan (Iqbal et al., 2012; Sheikh and Kareem, 2015; Lone et al., 2015;). They 
all find the insignificant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance expect 
(Usman et al., 2015) who find the significant negative relation.  
This study analyzes the relation between directors’ pay and firm performance in the Pakista-
ni financial sector. In the context of this investigation, it assumes that to enhance the wealth of 
shareholders, a firm needs to offer attractive remuneration packages to encourage directors, which 
will rise the monitoring efforts of directors.  
H1. The firm performance is positive significantly associated with the directors' pay 
Pay and Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance practices of an institution affect the remuneration of directors (Core et 
al., 1999). Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) argue that large board size is less organized and participative. 
Consent on any decision is problematic in large boards. On the other hand, small board size is less 
costly because few members on board and are also useful to take decision immediately compare to 
larger boards. The board size is associated with lower top executive compensation. Moreover; the 
larger boards are lead to lower corporate performance. Board size can influence the director remune-
ration. The board size influenced the controlling, monitoring and decision-making function in any 
corporation (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). The significant negative relation between direc-
tors' pay and board size is founded by (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Firth et al., 2007; Lee & Isa, 2015). 
There are some authors (Core et al., 1999; Coe et al., 2011) who document that the remuneration of 
director’s increases when board size increases. But Basu et al. (2007) find no relation between board 
size and directors' pay. According to Firth et al. (2007) argues that large board size is usually related 
to ineffectiveness and inefficiencies. In Pakistani scenario board size has no significance with 
CEO’s pay (Kashif & Mustafa, 2012). In the light of these arguments, it is expected: 
H2a. The board size has no significant association with the directors' pay 
The board independence is a vital aspect of the corporate governance that ensures the board 
effectiveness. The independent directors are supposed to be neutral in their decision making and the 
management can be effectively overseen by the independent directors. Effective management of the 
board independence is useful in important decision making. It is a general assumption that more the 
number of independent members on board, might act to control the extra CEO/executive directors' 
pay and also useful to raise the performance of the firm. The independent directors enlarge the com-
pensation of CEOs. More independent members on the board have increased the level of competen-
   
Social science section 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                                 515 
 
cy in board (Firth et al., 1999; Core et al., 1999). Mixed results found in the prior studies, some au-
thor’s (Brickley et al., 1999; Coe et al., 2011; Lee & Isa 2015)  find that increase in board indepen-
dence is also increase the directors' pay, but some (Fleming & Stellios, 2002; Brick et al., 2006; Ab-
dullah, 2006; Wang & Chen, 2016) authors conclude that increase in board independence decrease 
remuneration of directors. The insignificant relation finds by (Finkelstein & Hambric, 1989). In Pa-
kistani context board independence does not affect the CEO’s pay (Kashif & Mustafa, 2012; Lone et 
al., 2015). The negative coefficient is expected between directors' pay and board independence. 
H2b. The board independence is negative significantly related to the directors' pay     
The proportion of shares hold by the directors can be beneficial for the corporation. The 
stakeholder theory suggests a large managerial ownership makes the managers very conscious about 
firm decisions which are taken after in depth analysis because directors own risk is linked to these 
decisions. Higher directors' ownership normally provides higher control in the hands of the directors 
which provide them the opportunity to enhance their pay as the firm grows. In the absence of pay for 
performance, the owner-managers start tunneling. Some authors (Wei, 2000; Fleming & Stellios, 
2002; Doucouliagos et al., 2007; Basu et al., 2007) find a less remuneration in firm with large direc-
tors' ownership. Moreover, Cheung et al., (2005) and Wang & Chen, (2016) show higher pay for 
owner-managers as compared to non-owner managers. Lee and Isa (2015) find an insignificant as-
sociation between board ownership and directors' pay. In local studies, the significant positive rela-
tion between board ownership and CEO’s pay (Sheikh & Kareem, 2015). In the light of the above 
arguments, it is assumed that: 
H2c. The Directors' ownership is positive significantly related to directors' pay 
The CEO duality or dual designation of chairperson and CEO, provides the extra power to 
the single person, that power sometime may be reason to exploit the rights of minority shareholders. 
It is also documented that when in any organization inner ownership arise, the proportion of the out-
side director decline and the CEO duality have also declined. The agency theories argued that self-
interest directors on board can extract rents by misusing the structure of the board to create favora-
ble remuneration packages. According to managerial power theory the CEO and executive directors 
hold the extra power that associated to plan compensation contracts. These extra powers can capably 
to insulate themselves from restriction applied by shareholders and regulators. In the presence of the 
CEO duality, the executive director gets less remuneration as compared to those firms where CEO 
duality is not existing (Dorata & Petra, 2008). On the other hand, some researchers (Bebchuk et al., 
2002; Luo, 2015) document that in the presence of the CEO duality the executive directors get high-
er compensation. Some researchers find that CEO duality is not affecting the compensation of direc-
tors (Abullah, 2006; Lee & Isa, 2015). In the Pakistani scenario, there is no relation between the 
CEO duality and CEO’s pay (Kashif & Mustafa, 2012). This relationship is due to structure of Pa-
kistani firms where most of executive directors are family members and the majority of family firms 
are working under the umbrella of the business group (Bhutta and Tahir, 2017). They are more like-
ly involve in tunneling. So, this study also expecting the similar findings to Kashif & Mustafa 
(2012). 
H2d. CEO Duality is not significantly related to the directors' pay 
 
Methodology  
The data of financial firms of Pakistan are hand collected from their annual reports from year 
2007 to 2014. After leaving the firms which do have disclosure of directors' pay in their annual re-
port, the final sample consists of 52 financial firms listed on a Pakistan Stock Exchange. The final 
sample contains 21 banks, 15 insurance companies, and 16 investment companies, banks and securi-
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ties companies. To achieve the objective, this study uses three different measures of directors' pay 
and two different measures of firm performance along with corporate governance variables and firm 
specific control variables. The table 1 presents the list of variables used to achieve the objective of 
the study. 
Table 1.Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Definition Previous Authors' used 
Dependent Variables   
Total Directors' pay Nature Log of total Directors' accumu-
lative pay 
Unite et al., (2008) and  Isa & 
Lee, (2015)    
Executive Directors' 
pay 
Nature Log of executive Directors' pay Duffhues & Kabir (2008 and 
Wahab & Rahman (2009) 
CEO Pay Nature log of CEO pay Kato & Kabo (2006) and Ka-
shif & Mustafa (2012)` 
Variables of interest   
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Net income to total assets Kato & Kubo (2006); Mitsu-
dome et al., (2008) and Tian 
& Yang, 2014) 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Net income to total equity Jaafar et al., (2012) and Yang 
& Zhao (2014) 
Board Size Nature log of total number of directors Basu et al., (2007); Mayers & 
Smith, (2010) and Shiah-Hou 
& Cheng (2012) 
Board Independence Number of independent directors to 
total directors 
Basu et al., (2007);Minnick et 
al., (2011) and Liang et al., 
(2013) 
Baord Ownership Total shares held by directors to the 
number of outstanding shares 
Doucouliagos et al., (2007); 
Mayer & Smith, (2010); Byrd 
et al., (2010) and Luo (2015) 
CEO duality A dummy variable equal to one if 
Chair/CEO is the same person 
Brick et al., (2006); Dorata & 
Petra, (2008); Liang et al., 
(2013); Luo, (2015) 
Control Variables   
Firm Size Nature log of total assets  
Ownership Concentra-
tion 
Number of shares hold by top five 
shareholders/ Total number of shares 
 
Capital Ratio The capital over total assets, but in 
banking industry, mostly use a capital 
adequacy ratio that is calculated as 
capital coverage/ total risk weighted 
assets 
 
CEO Ownership The share held by CEO over total out-
standing shares of the firm. 
 
Board Meetings Total number of board meetings held 




A dummy variable 1 if firm has com-
pensation committee. 
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Model 
The study uses multiple regression models to test the hypothesis. The first equation is de-
fined to test the impact of firm performance on directors' pay, while the second model helps us to 
capture the impact of different governance variables on directors' pay.  
ܮ݊ ܲܽݕ௜௧ = ߙ௜௧ + ߚଵܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ + ߚଶܵܫܼܧ௜௧ + ߚଷܥܣܴܲܣ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚସܵܪܥܱ ௜ܰ௧ +
ߚହܤܦܯ݁݁ݐ௜௧ + ߚ଺ܥܧܱܱܹ ௜ܰ௧ + ߚ଻ܥܱܯܥܱܯܯ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧     (1) 
Where, 
ܮ݊ ܲܣ ௜ܻ௧ is the measure of directors' pay of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧  is the measure of performance (ROA and ROE) of firm i in year t as de-
fined in table 1.   
ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  is the natural log of total assets of firm i in year t. 
ܥܣܴܲܣ ௜ܶ௧ is capital ratio of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܵܪܥܱ ௜ܰ௧ is ownership concentration of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܤܦܯܧܧ ௜ܶ௧ is board meeting of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܥܧܱܱܹ ௜ܰ௧ is CEO ownership of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܥܱܯܥܱܯܯ௜௧ is compensation committee dummy of firm i in year t as defined  in table 1. 
ߝ௜௧ is the error term of firm i in year t. 
 
ܮ݊ ܲܽݕ௜௧ = ߙ௜௧ + ߚଵܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ + ߚଶܵܫܼܧ௜௧ + ߚଷܥܣܴܲܣ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚସܵܪܥܱ ௜ܰ௧ +
ߚହܤܦܯ݁݁ݐ௜௧ + ߚ଺ܥܧܱܱܹ ௜ܰ௧ + ߚ଻ܥܱܯܥܱܯܯ௜௧ + ߚ଼ܤܦܵܫܼܧ௜௧ + ߚଽܤܦܫܰܦ௜௧ + ߚଵ଴ܤܦܱܹ ௜ܰ௧ +
ߚଵଵܦݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧           
 (2)  
Where,  
all variables are defined as per equation 1 except the governance variables below: 
ܤܦܵܫܼܧ௜௧ is the board size of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܤܦܫܰܦ௜௧ is the ratio of board independent of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܤܦܱܹ ௜ܰ௧ is the board size of firm i in year t as defined in table 1. 
ܦݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜௧ is the dummy variable if firm i has same person as a chariman and CEO in year t. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 represents a summary of descriptive analysis. Total number of observations is 405. 
The average logarithm of total CEO pay is 9.48, But ranging is from minimum value 0 to maximum 
value 12.84. The CEOPAY value of median 9.53 is almost equal to the value of mean, but the value 
of mode is 7.9 less than value of mean and median. The standard deviation of CEO pay is 1.43 and 
skewness is almost equal to 1 but skeweness is negative. The mean and median of total pay of all 
directors are almost equal to each other, the value of mean and median is 10.06 and 10.03 respec-
tively. The mode of directors' pay is 9.8, which is slightly less than the mean and median. The value 
of skewness is -0.2 less than 1 but the value is negative. The standard deviation of directors' pay is 
1.24. The value of all the descriptive statistics of all the executive pay is similar to the CEO pay, be-
cause the major portion of the total pay of all executives is covered by the CEO pay. The mean of 
firm size is highest mean in all the descriptive analysis and smallest mean is ROE mean. The firm 
size’s maximum value is 21.35 and the minimum value is 9.96. The mean value of all the variables 
are positive expect ROE. The skewness of all the variables are less than 2 expects CEO ownership. 
 
 
Aamir Inam Bhutta, Muhammad Fayyaz Sheikh, Jahanzaib Sultan, Muhammad Azeem Naseer 
 
 




The table 3 shows correlation matrix. All the three dependent variables such as CEOPAY, 
DIRPAY and EXEPAY are highly correlated with each other. Because the CEOPAY has a major 
portion of the total of pay all directors and the total pay all executives. These high correlations will 
not affect the purpose of this study because these variables will not use simultaneously. The overall 
correlation matrix shows a very low correlation among all independent variables. It means that there 
is no issue of multicollinearity in regression analysis. That is also confirmed from the variance infla-
tion factor. 
 
Table 2.Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Stand. 
Error 
Median Mode Stand. 
Deviation
Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Sum Count
CEOPAY 9.480 0.071 9.526 7.897 1.426 -0.996 12.840 0.000 12.840 3839.399 405 
DIRPAY 10.057 0.062 10.029 9.780 1.241 -0.202 6.928 6.321 13.249 4073.263 405 
EXEPAY 9.526 0.070 9.569 7.897 1.417 -1.016 12.840 0.000 12.840 3858.025 405 
ROA 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.001 0.113 -1.472 1.186 -0.655 0.531 3.150 405 
ROE -0.016 0.043 0.082 0.003 0.863 -12.548 18.372 -14.743 3.630 -6.581 405 
BDSIZE 2.064 0.007 2.079 1.946 0.143 0.836 0.956 1.609 2.565 835.976 405 
BDIND 0.560 0.014 0.571 0.857 0.275 -0.139 0.909 0.091 1.000 226.791 405 
BDOWN 0.094 0.007 0.022 0.000 0.141 1.909 0.706 0.000 0.706 37.969 405 
SIZE 16.452 0.133 16.398 20.301 2.669 0.013 11.385 9.963 21.348 6662.909 405 
CAPRAT 0.307 0.036 0.219 0.425 0.717 -12.883 14.618 -12.156 2.462 124.249 405 
SHCON 0.653 0.011 0.700 0.600 0.221 -0.629 0.999 0.001 1.000 264.360 405 
CEOOWN 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.041 5.349 0.314 0.000 0.314 4.854 405 
BDMEET 1.690 0.014 1.609 1.386 0.287 1.013 1.447 1.386 2.833 684.533 405 
Note: CEOPAY stands for CEO pay, DIRPAY refers to total pay of all directors and EXEPAY denotes to the total 
pay of all the executive directors. ROA denotes return on assets.  ROE refers to return on equity. BDSIZE refers to the 
board size. BDIND refers to board independent. BDOWN denotes board shareholder. SIZE stands for total assets. 
CAPRAT stands for the firm capital ratio. SHCON refers to the shareholder concentration. CEOOWN is the CEO 
ownership. BDMEET refers to the board meeting. COMCOMM denotes the compensation committee. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Table 4 shows the results of impact of firm performance and corporate governance on direc-
tors' pay.  The tradition panel data procedure suggests the random effect method (previously used by 
Becher et al., 2005; Wooi & Ming, 2009) is most appropriate technique to test our hypothesis. The 
Model 1,3, and 5 test the impact of firm performance (ROA) on executive compensation using three 
proxies total directors' pay, executive directors' pay, and CEO' pay. The firm performance is positive 
significantly related to total directors' pay,  executive directors' pay, and CEO' pay at significant lev-
el less than 5%, 10%, and 10% respectively. These findings are consistent with the findings of Kato 
& Kubo, (2006) and Shaih-Hou & Cheng, (2012). It means the directors of well performed firms are 
paying well, which help the firm to reduce the agency problem. Firm size is significantly positively 
associated with all three proxies of executive compensation at significant level less than 1%. It 
means that economies of scale help the large firms to pay more of their directors. A negative sign (at 
significant level less than 1%) between capital ratio and directors' pay suggests that firm with more 
capital requirements relatively have less money to invest, consequently they pay less to their direc-
tors. There is negative significant relation between CEO ownership and all pay proxies at a level less 
than 1%. It means that a CEO with more cash flow rights is more likely to extract the reward 
through dividend instead increase his salary. An increase in salary may fall him an undesirable tax 
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bracket. A number of board meetings are only significantly positively associated with total directors' 
pay at a significant level less than 5%, because meeting fee is the only compensation most of inde-
pendent directors received. On the other hand, there is an insignificant relationship between board 
meetings and executive directors' pay as well as CEO pay. These findings are understandable as fee 
of board meetings is only an insignificant part of the executive salaries. The existence of the com-
pensation committee is positively related to pay across all three proxies significant at less than 1%. 
Because, the committee reviews the performance of the directors and compensate them accordingly. 
 
























1             
DIR-
PAY 
0.803 1            
EX-
EPAY 
0.994 0.802 1           
ROA 0.073 0.097 0.079 1          
ROE 0.013 0.052 0.014 0.312 1         
BDS-
IZE 
0.257 0.164 0.269 0.041 0.035 1        
BDIND -0.045 0.004 -0.062 -0.058 0.038 -0.069 1       
BDOW
N 
-0.172 -0.183 -0.142 0.103 0.042 -0.006 -0.160 1      
SIZE 0.740 0.707 0.737 0.037 0.030 0.360 0.013 -0.158 1     
CA-
PRAT 
-0.147 -0.149 -0.143 -0.007 0.019 0.004 -0.070 -0.184 -0.117 1    
SHCO
N 
0.239 0.299 0.215 -0.055 -0.050 -0.115 0.096 -0.258 0.249 -0.059 1   
CEOO
WN 
-0.353 -0.371 -0.343 -0.011 -0.003 -0.112 0.006 0.181 -0.303 -0.093 -0.219 1  
BDME
ET 
0.240 0.218 0.250 0.003 -0.120 0.055 -0.122 -0.118 0.287 -0.067 0.170 -0.168 1 
Note: CEOPAY stands for CEO pay, DIRPAY refers to total pay of all directors and EXEPAY denotes to the total pay 
of all the executive directors. ROA denotes return on assets.  ROE refers to return on equity. BDSIZE refers to the 
board size. BDIND refers to board independent. BDOWN denotes board shareholder. SIZE stands for total assets. CA-
PRAT stands for the firm capital ratio. SHCON refers to the shareholder concentration. CEOOWN is the CEO owner-
ship. BDMEET refers to the board meeting. COMCOMM denotes the compensation committee. 
 
The model 2, 4, and 6 test the impact of corporate governance characteristics on directors' 
compensation. These models are extension of models (1,3,5) with an introduction of corporate go-
vernance variables of interest. Qualitatively, the findings of control variables used in the models 
(1,3,5) are similar with their expected signs and significance, except proxy of ROA which is sensi-
tive with control of corporate governance variables. The relationship between ROA and Executive 
directors' pay as well as CEO' pay is insignificant. This is consistent with findings of Sheikh & Ka-
reem (2015). Board size is insignificant across all models. This relationship is similar to the previous 
findings in Pakistani context using non-financial firms' data (Kashif & Mustafa, 2012). It is well do-
cumented (Chen and Al-Najjar, 2012)  that large boards are costly, have problem of consensus 
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which usually cause delays in decision making, consequently firm performance decreases therefore 
directors pay is under question. An independent board has a negative significantly related to direc-
tors' pay across all proxies at significant level less than 1%. These findings are consistent with the 
previous findings (Brick et al., 2006; Wang & Chen, 2016). It means that an independent board acts 
in the best interest of minority shareholders and prevent the executive directors to increase their un-
usual compensation over the years. The board ownership is significantly positively related to direc-
tors' pay across all proxies at significant level less than 1%. It is documented that the directors those 
hold more shares charge extra remuneration compared to those directors who have less shares. The 
finding is similar to the finding of (Cheung et al., 2005; Wang & Chen, 2016). The CEO duality has 
no significant relation to directors' pay across all proxies. These results are consistent with previous 
findings (Abullah, 2006; Lee & Isa, 2015). 
 




         Model 1           Model 2  
  Dependent Variable is Total Director’s Pay 
         Model 3                       Model 4          
Dependent Variable is Total Executive’s 
Pay
        Model 5                    Model 6              
Dependent Variable is CEO’s Pay 
C  4.935*** (0.000)  5.106*** (0.000)  3.582*** (0.000)  3.323*** (0.000)  3.418*** (0.000)  3.326*** (0.000) 
Firm Performance and Control Variables 
ROA  0.618** (0.015)  0.435* (0.086)  0.444* (0.074)  0.234 (0.339)  0.464* (0.058)  0.275 (0.255) 
LnSIZE  0.266*** (0.000)  0.280*** (0.000)  0.340*** (0.000)  0.352*** (0.000)  0.347*** (0.000)  0.359*** (0.000) 
CAPRAT -0.144*** (0.001) -0.125** (0.005) -0.165*** (0.000) -0.142***  (0.001) -0.168*** (0.000) -0.149*** (0.000) 
SHA-
CON 
 0.388 (0.194)  0.419 (0.161)  0.095 (0.744)  0.166 (0.566)  0.203 (0.482)  0.258 (0.370) 
CEOOW
N 
-2.832*** (0.003) -2.530*** (0.007) -3.528*** (0.000) -3.161***  (0.001) -3.477*** (0.000) -3.118*** (0.001) 
LnBDM
EET 
 0.262**  (0.044)  0.215* (0.094)  0.191 (0.133)  0.128 (0.299)  0.152  (0.224)  0.095 (0.434) 
COM-
COMM 
 0.344*** (0.000)  0.262*** (0.000)  0.213*** (0.000)  0.113* (0.076)  0.215*** (0.000)  0.123** (0.050) 
Firm Governance Characteristics 
LnBDS-
IZE 
  -0.107 (0.750)    0.127 (0.679)   -0.043 (0.894) 
BDIND   -0.429*** (0.003)   -0.500***  (0.000)   -0.478*** (0.001) 
BDOWN    1.366*** (0.002)    1.613*** (0.000)    1.428*** (0.001) 
DUALI-
TY 
   0.118    (0.457)      0.188 (0.213)      0.199   (0.184)   
R2  0.639   0.537   0.725            0.650   0.725   0.651  
P-Value  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Notes: (a) The results of random effect regression. ROA denotes return on assets. LnSIZE stands for log of total assets. CAPRAT stands for the 
firm capital ratio. SHCON refers to the shareholder concentration. CEOOWN is the CEO ownership. LnBDMEET refers to the log of board meet-
ing. COMCOMM denotes the compensation committee and give the value 1 if firm has compensation committee, 0 otherwise. LnBDSIZE refers to 
log of board size. BDIND refers to board independent. BDOWN denotes board shareholder. DUALITY means CEO duality, give 1 if duality exists, 
0 otherwise. (b) The results of regression 1 and 2. The frequency in parentheses are p-value.*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.   
 
Robustness 
To validate the results across different proxies of performance, this study uses ROE as alter-
native measure of performance and retests the hypothesis. Table 5 shows the results of impact of 
firm performance and corporate governance on directors' pay. The tradition panel data procedure 
suggests the random effect method (previously used by Becher et al., 2005; Wooi & Ming, 2009) is 
most appropriate technique to test our hypothesis. The Model 1,3, and 5 test the impact of firm per-
formance (ROE) on executive compensation using three proxies total directors' pay, executive direc-
tors' pay, and CEO' pay. The ROE is significantly positively related to total pay of all directors at a 
level less than10% in model 1. This result is consistent with (Firth et al., 2006; Jafaar et al., 2012). 
While ROE has positive but insignificant relation to executive directors' pay and CEO' pay in model 
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3 & 5. These findings are supported by the previous of studies (Kashif & Mustafa, 2012). One of the 
reasons of insignificance is that ROE is not an effective proxy of performance in Pakistan because 
of significant firms with negative equity. This is also suggested by the negative mean of the ROE in 
table 2. The findings of the control variables are similar to the findings of table 4. Moreover, find-
ings of models 2, 4, 6 are qualitatively same as the findings of these models in table 5. We can say 
that qualitatively the findings of this study do not change with the change of performance proxy. 
 
Table 5.Imapct of Firm Performance and Corporate Governance on Directors' Pay 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1          Model 2  
  Dependent Variable is Total Director’s 
Pay 
Model 1                       Model 2          
Dependent Variable is Total Executive’s 
Pay
Model 1                     Model 2                
Dependent Variable is of CEO’s Pay 
C  4.901*** (0.000)  5.130*** (0.000)  3.557*** (0.000)  3.46***  (0.000)  3.389*** (0.000)  3.343*** (0.000) 
Firm Performance and Control Variables 
ROE  0.058* (0.078)  0.055* (0.085)  0.045 (0.164)  0.042 (0.183)  0.036 (0.251)  0.033 (0.281) 
LnSIZE  0.266*** (0.000)  0.280*** (0.000)  0.340*** (0.000)  0.351*** (0.000)  0.348*** (0.000)  0.360*** (0.000) 
CAPRAT -0.141*** (0.001) -0.120** (0.006) -0.163*** (0.000) -0.139***  (0.001) -0.166*** (0.000) -0.146***  (0.000) 
SHACON  0.401 (0.184)  0.426 (0.159)  0.109 (0.710)  0.174 (0.544)  0.112 (0.468)  0.263 (0.364) 
CEOOWN -2.761*** (0.004) -2.430** (0.010) -3.480*** (0.000) -3.104***  (0.001) -3.431*** (0.000) -3.062***  (0.001) 
LnBDMEET  0.282**  (0.031)  0.232* (0.071)  0.205 (0.108)  0.140 (0.258)  0.163 (0.194)  0.104 (0.397) 
COMCOMM  0.334*** (0.000)  0.246*** (0.000)  0.205*** (0.000)  0.104* (0.097)  0.208*** (0.000)  0.114* (0.068) 
Firm Governance Characteristics 
LnBDSIZE   -0.131 (0.696)    0.107 (0.742)    0.022 (0.945) 
BDIND   -0.465*** (0.001)   -0.519***  (0.000)   -0.449***  (0.000) 
BDOWN    1.551*** (0.000)    1.728*** (0.000)    1.550*** (0.000) 
DUALITY    0.104   (0.508)      0.184 (0.223)      0.192 (0.198)   
R2  0.630   0.517   0.718          0.638   0.719          0.640  
P-Value  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Notes: (a) The results of random fixed regression. ROE denotes return on equity. LnSIZE stands for log of total assets. CAPRAT stands for the firm 
capital ratio. SHCON refers to the shareholder concentration. CEOOWN is the CEO ownership. LnBDMEET refers to the log of board meeting. 
COMCOMM denotes the compensation committee and give the value 1 if firm has compensation committee, 0 otherwise. LnBDSIZE refers to log 
of board size. BDIND refers to board independent. BDOWN denotes board shareholder. DUALITY means CEO duality, give 1 if duality exists, 0 
otherwise. (b) The results of regression 3 and 4. The frequency in parentheses are p-value.*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.   
 
Conclusion 
This research will contribute to the growing literature on directors' pay using the data of the 
financial sector of Pakistan. The secondary data of 52 listed firms for the period from 2007 to 2014 
are collected from the annual reports. Three proxies (total directors' pay, executive directors' pay, 
and CEO' pay) of compensation have been used to test the hypothesis. Using the random effective 
method, this study finds that more profitable firms pay more compensation to their directors. This 
significant positive relationship holds across all proxies of directors' pay. These findings are cohe-
rent with the hypothesis 1 and previous studies such as Kato & Kubo, (2006) and Shaih-Hou & 
Cheng, (2012). Moreover, large firms and firms with compensation committee are paying more of 
their directors, while firms with high capital ratio and CEO ownership pay less salary to the direc-
tors. 
Furthermore, the extended version of model tries to capture the impact of four (board size, 
board independence, board ownership, and CEO Duality) corporate governance elements on direc-
tors' pay. The findings also accept the hypothesis from H2a to H2d. Consistent with findings of Ka-
shif & Mustafa (2012), large board does not quickly respond to the issues of firm effectively. This 
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insignificance association can be caused by the board members do not participate in board meeting 
or board decision making process. Because most firms only full fill the requirement minimum mem-
ber on board. Consistent with previous studies (Brick et al., 2006; Wang & Chen, 2016, an indepen-
dent board acts in the best interest of minority owners and prevents the executive directors to in-
crease their unusual compensation over the years. As the ownership structure of Pakistani firms is 
different from the other developed courtiers like Japan, America, England etc.. Most of the execu-
tive directors of firm have a large portion of shares or any family member of the executive directors 
have major shareholder of the firm. That is why, they are in a position to control the firm and set 
director compensation accordingly. The positive relation between board ownership and directors' 
pay of the financial sectors of Pakistan is consistent with the studies such as (Cheung et al., 2005; 
Wang & Chen, 2016). The CEO duality has no significant relation to directors' pay across all prox-
ies. These results are consistent with previous findings (Abullah, 2006; Lee & Isa, 2015). 
Majority of Pakistani firms is family owned and working under the umbrella of business 
groups. It would be interesting to extend this study in context of business groups and family firms.  
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